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ABSTRACT 
In 2012, North Mali was riven by an armed insurrection. The rebellion was led by the National 
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a mostly Tuareg armed organization, allied 
with Islamist elements. Its aim was the secession of the Northern territories of the country and to 
claim the independence of Azawad. Throughout the different phases of the crisis, the MNLA al-
ways remained a key actor, being able to reshape its political and military strategy in order to adapt 
to the evolution of the situation. In this context, France played a capital role. French authorities 
contributed to giving a new political legitimacy to the Tuareg insurgents, despite strong opposition of 
political élites in Bamako; the Tuareg insurgents de facto exploited France, leveraging its security 
interests in pursuit of their own political goals. Examining the agency of insurgent actors in Kidal 
allows outlining the power relationship with the state institutions and the attempt of consolidating a 
system of informal rebel governance. 
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1. Introduction 
The 2012-2013 crisis in Mali has defined a highly complex security envi-
ronment, characterised by the presence of state and non-state actors and by the 
structuring of evolving strategic alliances, depending on changing circumstances and 
the prevalence of particular interests. 
The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) was a key 
player in the crisis. The insurrection launched during the first months of 2012 re-
vealed the elements of structural fragility of the Malian state, which was deemed to 
be a model of democratic governance during the ‘90s (Thiriot 2002; Wing 2008). 
From the early 2000s, deep cleavages, particularly rooted in the desert areas of the 
north, acted as destabilising forces in the regional system. First, the proliferation of 
criminal trafficking networks (of drugs, weapons and human beings) developed as 
part of highly interconnected regional systems (Lacher 2012; Scheele 2012). Then, 
several jihādist armed groups, established during the Algerian civil war, were pushed 
into Northern Mali as a result of the harsh military repression of the Algiers regime 
(Harmon 2010; Lounnas 2013). Lastly, the recurrent environmental and climate cri-
ses boosted the spread of community conflicts over the access to natural resources.  
The demands for independence of the Tuareg movement contributed to 
the political and institutional collapse of the country, deeply weakened by limited 
state capacity and a neo-patrimonial system of governance based on political nepo-
tism, patronage and corruptive practices (Bergamaschi 2014). The military capture 
of the territories of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu by a heterogeneous coalition of 
Salafi-jihādist armed groups, following the MNLA’s declaration of independence of 
Azawad, was partly a result of the loss of legitimacy of the Tuareg nationalist de-
mands – as compared to the 1990s’ rebellion – which were essentially disconnected 
from the north-Malian social fabric.  
The evolution in the regional political status quo encouraged a redefinition 
of the MNLA strategic view. The secular movement capitalised the diplomatic 
openness of French authorities – who needed military support in the fight against 
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the Qaedist armed groups in the mountain region of the Adrar n Ifoghas – in order 
to gain international recognition of their autonomist claims in Kidal and obtain the 
consolidation of an informal system of governance.  
We will focus hereby on the MNLA's changing sources of legitimacy in the 
Azawad, ranging from a presumed popular legitimacy, directly related to the social 
representativeness of its political claims, to an international legitimacy, that is an 
outcome of the movement's agency in leveraging on French interests, on one side, 
and the French authorities' co-opting strategies towards the Tuareg nationalists, on 
the other side, in the framework of the struggle on Salafi-jihādist armed groups. 
This paper is based on a fieldwork conducted in Paris (April-June 2016) 
and Bamako (November-December 2016) through the collection of semi-structured 
interviews – selected quotes have been translated from French to English – of pol-
icy-makers, diplomatic and military officers, members of international (EU, UN) 
missions. It aims at reconstructing the dynamics of the MNLA’s presence in the 
north-Malian region, the evolution of its political strategies and its search for legiti-
macy on the internal and international level. Furthermore, the paper analyses the 
power struggle between the MNLA and the state actors in Mali, as well as the con-
flict relationship with the Salafi-jihādist actors in the North, outlining elements of 
interest for further reflection, while contributing to the debate on insurgencies, re-
bel governance and areas of limited statehood. 
 
2. Legitimacy, terrorism, limited statehood: theoretical premises 
The concept of legitimacy defines the theoretical boundaries of the politi-
cal discourse about the state in Mali and the MNLA as a central actor in the north. 
Weber defines legitimacy as “the basis of every system of authority, and corre-
spondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief […] by virtue of which 
persons exercising authority are lent prestige” (Weber 1964, p. 382). He assumes 
that legitimacy rests on the belief of the absolute validity of a political order that 
generates people’s voluntary compliance with the state authority. Generally, empiri-
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cal legitimacy can be described as a social group’s sense of obligation or willingness 
to accept the authority of governance actors, including external and non-state ac-
tors; it is an essential condition for the effectiveness of rule and the resilience of the 
systems of governance (Börzel & Risse 2018). Beetham adopts a different approach 
to legitimacy, stressing that “a given power relationship is not legitimate because 
people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their be-
liefs” (Beetham 1991, p. 11). He characterises as ‘legitimate’ any order that ad-
dresses people’s demands of ‘moral’ legitimacy (Thomas 2013). This definition of 
legitimacy is based on three levels: its conformity to established rules; the fact that 
rules can be justified by reference to shared beliefs; the expression of consent on 
the part of subordinate groups to the power relation (McCullogh 2015).  
While normative legitimacy can be justified according to universal and 
normative standards, empirical legitimacy is directly linked to the outputs provided 
by governance actors, in terms of normative appropriateness of capacity-building or 
service provision towards the population (Krasner & Risse 2014). Even if the nor-
mative legitimacy of an actor is questionable, its empirical legitimacy among sup-
porters might be well grounded.  
According to Suchman, legitimacy is a “generalised perception or assump-
tion that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some 
socially constructed norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman 1995, p. 574). 
Stillman describes legitimacy as “the compatibility of the results of governmental 
output with the value patterns of the relevant systems” (Stillman 1974, p. 48), stress-
ing that a government is legitimate when it protects and enhances the values and 
norms of its citizens. Similarly, Levi points out that the legitimacy stems from the 
awareness that citizens have of the appropriateness of structures, officials and gov-
ernance processes. Therefore, although it is possible to govern with the use of coer-
cive power only, legitimate power makes the government more effective, because it 
facilitates the exercise of the domain, empowering the authority to steer the behav-
iours (Levi et al. 2009).  
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A key aspect of the notion of legitimacy stems from the capacity of the 
state to respond to the needs of the population. It is directly linked to the effective-
ness of policies to deliver collective goods and services, which the social contract 
between government and governed is based on (Rotberg 2004), or the govern-
ment’s accountability towards citizens and their basic needs. The absence of the 
state in the domain of the provision of essential goods and services to the popula-
tions of marginalised areas, which enables non-state political or military actors to fill 
the state performance deficits, produces severe consequences for the service-related 
legitimacy of the system (Cilliers & Sisk 2013). The deficits in the state capacity un-
dermine the quality of the political processes, nourishing centrifugal claims in areas 
of limited statehood (Krasner & Risse 2014).  
The definition of ‘areas of limited statehood fits in the larger debate on 
ungoverned spaces in Sahel. In areas of limited statehood “central authorities lack 
the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions or […] the legitimate mo-
nopoly over the means of violence is lacking, at least temporarily” (Risse 2013, p. 4). 
This enables non-state actors to contest eventually institutional orders and to take 
over the role of state actors in enforcing regulations, ensuring security through the 
monopoly over the means of violence, delivering public services. External or rebel 
actors engage in state-building processes in order to fill the political or administra-
tive capacity gap of the state (Krasner & Risse 2014). Order contestation “increases 
the risk of fragmenting societies along ethnic, religious, and ideological lines, 
thereby undermining social cohesion and trust. [...] The interaction between con-
tested orders and limited statehood bears the risk of governance breakdowns” 
(Börzel & Risse 2018, p. 13) and violent opposition by non-state political actors 
seeking to establish a different order. As a result, governance in areas of limited 
statehood relies on a combination of state and non-state actors, lacking a fully func-
tioning state capable to enforce and implement decisions (Risse 2012).  
Generally, the concept of ‘ungoverned space’ is understood as a political 
space deprived of effective institutional control and directly related to the existence 
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of a security threat (Keister 2014). It assumes the inability of the state to rule a spe-
cific territory, ignoring though the existence of rebel-governed spaces and failing in 
adequately describing a social and political system defined by the interactions 
among different actors that do not comply with institutional and formal dynamics 
of control. In that sense, as claimed by Börzel and Risse, areas of limited statehood 
characterised by a dysfunctional state are rarely ‘ungoverned’, because “the provi-
sion of rules and regulations as well as of public goods and services does not neces-
sarily depend on the existence of functioning state institutions” (Börzel & Risse 
2015, p. 5). In North Mali, territories that meet the definition of ‘ungoverned 
spaces’ are marked by the presence of corrupted institutional power and bad politi-
cal and socio-economic performances of formal governance structures, as well as 
the activation of informal governance processes. Consequently, more than ‘ungov-
erned spaces’ North Mali is characterised by multiple actors competing for power 
and influence – local and traditional authorities, traffickers, insurgent groups – and 
overlapping forms of governance (Bleck et al. 2016). This leads to rethinking and 
calling into question the ‘fragile state’ paradigm, understood as a political narrative 
that is instrumental in the pursuit of specific interests (Nay 2013). The limits of ca-
pacity, legitimacy and effectiveness of institutional presence in marginal and non-
strategic areas create a political vacuum occupied by non-institutional actors. The 
criminalisation of informal governance processes in the so-called ‘ungoverned ar-
eas’, which is achieved by emphasising the role of external actors and the interpreta-
tions of instability as a product of ‘terrorism’ of armed groups, builds politically the 
need for international intervention that, in the case of Mali, has been associated 
with the militarisation of territories. 
Finally, the debate on power relations between state and non-state – local 
or international – actors has been articulated around the ‘liberal peace’ framework, 
which outsources the problem of international intervention in terms of violation of 
state sovereignty or local capacity to build peace through the use of force against 
different forms of local resistance (Charbonneau & Sears 2014). The implied mean-
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ing of the concept of ‘terrorism’ relates to a moral judgement on the use of force 
and violence. The ‘terrorist violence’ is delegitimised, while the terrorist actor is de-
humanised and abstract from the specific historical context (Charbonneau & Jourde 
2016). Ignoring the domestic drivers of insurgencies and characterising local actors 
as ‘terrorist’ may risk of misrepresenting their nature, with crucial policy implica-
tions such as “enabling government abuses that have previously driven recruitment 
into armed groups” (Matfess 2019). Reducing – for analytical purposes – the com-
plexity of armed groups that challenge the state monopoly on the use of force im-
plies undermining political and social claims related to state governance, service de-
livery inefficiency, government abuses, socio-economic marginalisation and imbal-
ances in the distribution of resources. Therefore, prioritising a ‘terrorist’ label in the 
discourse about radical armed groups leads to the adoption of ineffective policy re-
sponses to local drivers of insurgency. 
 
3. Legitimacy in rebel governance systems 
Insurgent governance systems, based on practices through which rebel 
forces are able to control social interactions and to rule civil populations, require “a 
normative assessment of the ability of a rebel political authority to regulate life 
within a defined territory. Thus a ‘governance system’ refers to the practices of rule 
insurgents adopt” (Mampilly 2011, p. 4). The effectiveness of rebel governance re-
lates to territorial control and security, institutional development and public good 
provision. Mampilly points out that the institution of a police force and the estab-
lishment of a legal mechanism are “determinant as to whether the rebel group is 
able to make the transition from a roving insurgency to a stationary one” (Mampilly 
2011, p. 63). Rebel governance systems may include coercive, extractive and redis-
tributive activities, through which non-state insurgent groups regulate socio-
economic and political aspects of life, ranging from the violence monopoly over the 
territory under their control up to taxation, public goods provision, judicial and ad-
ministrative structures.  
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Legitimacy, as a process constantly re-negotiated (O’Connor 2019), stands 
as a condition for rebel groups to stay in power. It allows non-state actors to exert 
power through voluntary or quasi-voluntary compliance, which is occasionally 
backed up by coercion (McCullogh 2015). When rebel forces become involved in 
governance processes, implementing collectively binding rules and providing a so-
cial contract based on the delivery of public services – security from state violence; 
education; health needs; food production and distribution, social justice – they have 
to legitimate themselves, justifying their agendas and actions in order to seek mate-
rial and moral support from local communities. Performative legitimacy, in this 
sense, results from a delivery-based legitimization process. However, it is clear that, 
in the context of weak and predatory states, armed actors can gain legitimacy im-
plementing minimal provision standards of security and protection (McCullogh 
2015).  
Worral states that legitimacy is “generated with reference to local norms, 
identities and realities which resonate with target populations. In this sense it at-
tempts to link to local ordering practices and structures but can equally derive 
strength by challenging these same processes” (Worral 2017, p. 715). He describes 
pragmatic forms of legitimacy, based on protection, provision of services or will-
ingness to share power, and moral legitimacy, which derives from the compatibility 
with existing social norms and moral or religious codes (Worral 2017). Legitimacy is 
therefore a social construction that shapes the rebel governance order and the ab-
sence of legitimacy influences the sustainability of the rebel order and the capacity 
of insurgent actors to operate and meet their own goals. 
While coercion is often related to the use of violence in order to shape ci-
vilian behaviours and induce obedience, with the risk of being counterproductive 
and jeopardizing the stability of the system of rebel governance (Péclard & Mechou-
lan 2015), legitimation strategies increase the compliance of local populations and 
provide sustainability to their governance systems. Frerks and Terpstra highlight 
five legitimation strategies adopted by rebel groups. First, looking at a socio-
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economic and political dimension, rebel leaders claim their positions as representa-
tives of the local community’s grievances. Second, they describe the enemy as in-
human and as a threat against which it is needed to adopt a violent action. The cha-
risma of the leadership is also relevant as a source of legitimacy, as well as the readi-
ness of the rebel fighters to sacrifice their life for a common goal. Lastly, the refer-
ence to popular belief systems, shared traditions, local cultures or religion may en-
sure legitimacy to rebel forces (Frerks & Terpstra 2017). Particularly, non-armed 
groups' strategies instrumentalising religion have been used to delegitimise existing 
power structures and systems of inequality, as shown through the strengthening of 
Salafi actors in North Mali (McCullogh 2015). 
In order to obtain support of local populations, rebel organisations “adapt 
their message to local belief, or educate civilians to change their preferences” (Kas-
fir 2005, p. 281) through legitimation strategies. The absence of legitimacy could 
weaken the rebel control of territories and populations, encouraging noncompli-
ance, collaboration with the state or other non-state actors, sabotage actions and 
violent actions by local-based militias: these challenges push insurgent actors to ne-
gotiate with civilians and not to resort to systematic coercion (Péclard & Mechoulan 
2015).  
Rebel orders may take different forms depending on different styles of 
governance: some rebel actors may take territories to create proto-states while oth-
ers may exert remote control governance lacking sufficient resources to hold territo-
ries. In any case, they need to engage with civilian populations to pursue their aims 
(Worral 2017). The legitimacy of rebel actors is therefore a crucial element to un-
derstand the dynamics of rebel governance.  
Among the sources of legitimacy, external actors and international inter-
ventions forces are also supposed to play a critical role, through recognition of non-
state insurgent actors as potential partner for cooperation or negotiation. Nonethe-
less, international recognition as a source of legitimacy does not automatically en-
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sure the strengthening of insurgent governance systems, when opposed to locally 
rooted sources of legitimacy (Duyvesteyn 2017).  
 
3. The MNLA and the 2012 insurgency in North Mali: a matter of legitimacy  
The MNLA was officially established in November 2011. A general con-
sent on the aims of the insurgency led to the merger of some heterogeneous groups, 
such as Tuareg fighters coming back to North Mali after the fall of al-Qadhafi's re-
gime (Lecocq & Klute 2013),1 militiamen involved in the '90s Tuareg rebellion 
(Cristiani & Fabiani 2013), Kel tamashek army deserters (Livermore 2013). From 
the political side, the civilian members of the National Movement of Azawad 
(MNA) asked the government in Bamako to put an end to structural political, so-
cial, economic marginalisation in the north of the country (Branson & Wilkinson 
2013) and adopted a legitimation strategy based on a presumed representativeness 
of the local socio-political grievances through a cross-ethnic approach.  
 
In light of the successive crises that have occurred in the region of 
Azawad and the need to find solutions, the Mouvement National de 
l’Azawad (MNA) has been designated as the most relevant entity to po-
litically address the needs and concerns of the people of Azawad […] 
on the whole.2 
 
Several Tuareg insurgencies have succeeded in Malian history. The first re-
bellion occurred in the 1960s, following the declaration of independence of French 
Sudan: the Tuareg insurgents, belonging to the Ifoghas clan, opposed Modibo 
Keita’s socialist government, who repressed the rebels and militarized the region of 
Kidal. The second insurgency occurred in the early ‘90s and contributed to the col-
lapse of Moussa Traoré’s authoritarian regime (Grémont 2010). Lengthy negotia-
1 Many Tuareg people decided to move to Libya in the 1980s due to the poor socio-economic condi-
tions in their homeland. Once in Libya, they were enlisted and trained in the national army. 
2 ‘2010 dans l’Azawad (Nord du Mali). L’année du chaos sécuritaire, politique, économique et clima-
tique’, 03 November 2011, viewed 16 October 2019. < http://mnlamov.net/actualites/46-2010.html 
> 
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tions led to the signing of the 1996 peace agreement in Timbuktu (Boilley 1999). A 
third rebellion took place in 2006 and was fuelled by clan and intra-ethnic rivalries, 
and by the armed groups’ interests in illicit trafficking networks (Lecocq 2010). In 
the case of 2012 MNLA's rebellion, the most peculiar aspect was linked to the wid-
ening of the political claims to the benefit of all ethnic communities in the region, 
due to the sharing of common problems by the local Tuareg, Songhai, Fulani and 
Arab people (Cline 2013). According to the MNLA's propaganda, secessionist 
claims were raised not only as expression of an existential right of the Tuareg com-
munities to have their own homeland and obtain the recognition of an independent 
state, but also as the manifestation of the needs of the Northern populations to free 
themselves from a predatory and corrupt state. Furthermore, the nationalist rebels 
claimed that the armed offensive of January 2012 represented a legitimate response 
to the progressive militarization of Northern Mali. This had been imposed through 
the deployment of anti-terrorism programmes (Niang 2013) and the adoption of the 
Special Programme for Peace, Security and Development of North Mali (PSPSDN), 
financed by bilateral and multilateral donors. It was seen as an instrument for 
strengthening the military presence in the region rather than as a driver for the de-
velopment of the Sahelian territories (International Crisis Group 2012). In this 
sense, the insurgents sought to obtain popular legitimacy depicting Malian govern-
ment as willing to establish a 'southern' military presence in the North, through a 
vertical management structure and a lack of participation by the local communities.  
The legitimacy of MNLA’s demands was, however, inherently fragile, 
weakened by the lack of popular support given to the Azawad liberation movement 
(Gaasholt 2013). Despite claiming to represent the ethnically heterogenous north-
Malian populations (Chauzal & van Damme 2015), it was still perceived as a Tuareg 
ethno-nationalist organization (Klute 2013) and a tool in the hands of influential 
Kel intessar or Kel adagh clans to give strength to their own political interests, while 
claiming an abstract right to act on behalf of the people of the north. Several Arab, 
Fulani, Songhai communities and many Tuareg members of rival tribal confedera-
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tions – such as Kel ansar and Kel iwellemmedan – were opposed to the MNLA, 
denying support and legitimacy to Tuareg rebels. Internal tensions and disagree-
ments on whether the movement had to claim independence or a broader form of 
autonomy, weakened its cohesion and the coherence of its stances, with an impact 
on representativeness and legitimacy (Pezard & Shurkin 2015).  
The deep heterogeneity of the armed movements in the Sahel-Saharan re-
gion of Mali did not prevent the formation of short-term arrangements to oppose 
the political power in Bamako. In particular, the events that took place in the first 
months of 2012 were the result of a convergence between the secular MNLA and 
Ansār al-Dīn, a Salafi Tuareg-based movement led by Iyad Ag Ghali, which advo-
cated the institutionalisation of sharī’a law in the whole country without claiming 
the independence of the Azawad. (Thurston & Lebovich 2013). A former national-
ist leader of the ‘90s Tuareg rebellion, he created Ansār al-Dīn after a failed attempt 
to be appointed as aménokal3 of the Ifoghas clan and head of the MNLA. Leverag-
ing on a strong individual charismatic leadership, ag Ghali gave birth to his new po-
litical and military organisation. He adopted a legitimation strategy based on the 
Salafi-jihādist ideology and the rhetoric of the violent struggle against state authori-
ties and the Western powers, in a social environment where the growing influence 
of political Islam in the public sphere was “rooted in a call for better social justice 
and a will to reassert ethical values in response to growing corruption” (Marchal 
2013, p. 4).  
In the background, the main Qaedist groups in the area – al-Qā’ida in the 
Islamic Maghreb and the Movement for Unity and Jihād in West Africa, signifi-
cantly involved in drug trafficking4 (Raineri & Strazzari 2015) – provided military 
and financial support to Ansār al-Dīn, thanks to the common ideological positions 
3 The title of Tuareg’s traditional political leaders. 
4 While the involvement of AQIM in the criminal trafficking activities was circumscribed to the col-
lection of taxes imposed on convoys carrying drugs or illicit goods to allow them to pass through the 
desert zones under their control, the MUJWA was deeply involved in trans-Sahelian trafficking net-
works, thanks to the complicity of local politicians and traditional authorities. 
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and political demands. The differences among the insurgent actors were provision-
ally put aside in order to pursue a common interest: opposing the militarization of 
sub-Saharan territories, breaking the resistance of the Malian army and taking con-
trol of the Northern regions of the country. Because of its alliance with the jihādist 
groups, the MNLA attracted accusations of involvement in international terrorism 
activities by the government and the international community. 
The military attack by MNLA and Ansār al-Dīn began in January 2012. 
The rebels forced the Malian army, poorly equipped and inadequately trained for 
combat in a desert environment, to retreat in the face of the sudden offensive (Per-
ret 2014). The coup d’état by some non-commissioned officers in Bamako,5 aimed at 
strengthening the military response to the rebels' offensive in the North, had the 
opposite effect to precipitate out the events, speeding up the collapse of the army 
and increasing considerably the number of deserter soldiers, many of which were 
convinced to switch allegiances to the insurgency (Wing 2016).  
By the end of March, the rebels occupied the main towns in the north. 
The mujāhidīn of AQIM played a leading role in the fall of the cities of Kidal and 
Timbuktu (Lounnas 2012). Two-thirds of the country therefore ended up under the 
control of the MNLA and the jihādist militiamen. The capture of the North Mali by 
nationalist insurgents and jihādist militants went together with a progressive restruc-
turing of power relationships between the MNLA and the Qaedist groups. On April 
2, Ansār al-Dīn, with the support of AQIM, forced the MNLA to leave Timbuktu’s 
city centre. In the same vein, Kidal was placed under the control of Ag Ghali's 
fighters, who accessed the town first after the withdrawal of the Malian army. In 
fact, Ansār al-Dīn broke the alliance with the MNLA and announced the imposition 
of Islamic law on the occupied areas (International Crisis Group 2012). 
5 The coup leader, Amadou Haya Sanogo, accused the president Touré of feeding his own influence 
in the north without addressing the root causes of the Tuareg insurgency. He was also charged of 
having displayed an excessively conciliatory behavior towards the armed groups in Azawad. It is 
worth noting that, before the coup, several demonstrations had already revealed a deep popular dis-
satisfaction with a corrupted political class who shared responsibility for the crisis with the rebels. 
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On April 6, 2012, despite the loss of centrality in the political and military 
balances of the alliance, the MNLA proclaimed the independence of Azawad. Nev-
ertheless, the unilateral declaration did not mean achieving nationalist aims. Rather, 
it seemed to lay the foundations for the crystallisation of a jihādist sanctuary in the 
heart of the Sahel. The full deployment of Ag Ghali's fighters in the cities left by the 
national army and the increased presence of the mujāhidīn of AQIM and MUJWA 
forced the MNLA to withdraw to the suburban areas of the main towns (Pellerin 
2012). On June 26, the MUJWA members, who had strongly consolidated their 
presence in Gao enjoying the support of AQIM’s leaders, attacked the MNLA mili-
tias, instrumentalising a widespread anti-MNLA sentiment among local communi-
ties (Desgrais et al. 2018). They inspired a popular uprising that forced the MNLA 
to flee the city and to take refuge in Ménaka, before being chased away from the 
town in November 2012 (Lecocq & Klute 2019).  
 
4. The jihādist performative legitimacy and the consolidation of power in 
Azawad  
 By the autumn of 2012, the alliance among Islamist movements was exert-
ing a military and administrative control over the entire north of Mali: Ansār al-Dīn 
reinforced its presence in Kidal, the MUJWA had its stronghold in Gao while 
AQIM was mainly based in Timbuktu.  
In October, facing a situation of political and military marginalisation, the 
MNLA began to redefine its political strategies. The movement announced the sur-
render of its secessionist claims and the adoption of a new approach towards Malian 
institutions and the international community, based on a more acceptable demand 
for regional self-determination. The leadership of the Tuareg-based organisation 
sought to obtain international recognition and support (Marchal 2012): this was a 
first step in the process of changing its sources of legitimacy, acknowledging itself 
as a trustworthy (secular) bargaining partner in North Mali, whose support would 
have been essential in the struggle against jihādist actors.  
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Several factors favoured the strengthening of Ansār al-Dīn and the other 
jihādist groups in terms of popular support: first, the advance towards Gao and 
Timbuktu was fostered by the presence of a non-hostile social, politico-economic 
and religious ground to the project of promoting a strict version of shar’īa law 
within the framework of the Malian state. Qaedist organisations co-opted and 
funded several religious leaders and traditional authorities, obtaining in return the 
support for the spread of a Salafi Islam (Konaté 2015): they acted somehow as a le-
gitimation driver for the jihādist actors, which took advantage of religious beliefs to 
achieve compliance from local communities and delegitimise institutional powers 
and international actors.  
AQIM had established its operational base in Timbuktu since the early 
2000s, operating in a largely undisturbed manner thanks to what many analysts con-
sidered a kind of ‘non-belligerent’ agreement with the Government of Amadou 
Toumani Touré (personal communication, former civil servant at the French Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, 24 May 2016). Abd al-Malik Drukdal's organization adopted 
a thorough and gradual social penetration strategy, based on a combination of mili-
tary, political, religious, economic and humanitarian instruments (Bøås & Torheim 
2013). It structured a network of alliances with local communities, assisting them 
financially and offering protection from criminals (Tham Lindell & Mattsson 2014): 
“al-Qā’ida [is presented] as the defender of the local population and, more globally, 
of all Muslims. Thus, AQIM and its affiliated Salafi-inspired movements stand out 
as fighters for the rights of local people in order to get the necessary support from 
them’’ (Lounnas 2012, p. 52). During the occupation, AQIM's members built a ‘ji-
hādist’ welfare system, based on the delivery of essential services such as water, elec-
tricity, land, mineral resources, employment and housing policies, to the benefit of 
historically marginalised communities (De Georgio 2015). They gradually obtained a 
performative-based social legitimacy, filling the gap in institutional governance 
through the provision of security, justice and basic goods. 
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The Northern Malian communities called for safety, education and 
health that they did not obtain from the Malian state. The jihādist 
groups provided services, the Gao hospital worked very well during the 
occupation and there were no security problems. [...] The shar’īa was al-
ready the traditional source of justice for civil disputes. [...] The reality is 
that, as the state justice does not work, the traditional justice has to be 
applied. In any case, the people concerned will grab on whom can pro-
vide them with a minimum standard of protection and security (per-
sonal communication, former civil servant at the French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 24 May 2016). 
 
AQIM and the jihādist groups proved particularly careful to nourish the 
support of the populations, by addressing their basic needs. They capitalized on the 
popular discontent caused by the widespread insecurity, the multiplication of com-
munity conflicts, the lack of public services and the endemic poverty. They pro-
vided subsidies and economic assistance to poor families, further strengthening 
their social relationships to local communities (Briscoe 2014). 
 
The communities said that they felt safe. They did not pay taxes and en-
joyed some [social] support. When someone was sick, [the jihādists] 
took care of him. [...] They introduced an element of certainty of legal 
punishment. [...] We should admit that they are not bandits; they are in-
dividuals with [political] objectives. [...] It is true that not everyone ac-
cepts their project, but it is after all a project aiming to build something. 
[...] Some farmers in Timbuktu told me that when the jihādists were 
there, local communities were happier. [...] At a certain point in time, 
the communities benefited entirely from the water and electricity with-
out paying, even if this situation could not last forever: probably, a so-
cially accepted price would have been negotiated. Therefore, there is a 
clear problem of governance – bad governance practices, corruption, 
favouritism, nepotism – while the rights and aspirations of the people 
were better met while the Salafi-jihādists were there. The state often 
abuse its power, does not fulfil its obligations in the domain of public 
service. Our politicians have personal ambitions that are detrimental to 
the satisfaction of the people concerned (personal communication, civil 
servant at the Malian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, originally from Tim-
buktu, 15 December 2016). 
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In sharp contrast to the state of neglect of the north, in the absence of 
public services, infrastructure and structural investments (Bleck & Michelitch 2015), 
the jihādist system was based first on ensuring the incorruptibility of Islamist offi-
cials and on effective public order and security management. Justice was ensured by 
the certainty of a legal punishment proportional to the offence committed, and by 
means of extensive and rigorous social control carried out by an Islamic police, of-
ten made up of young people recruited locally (Konaté 2015). This ‘real governance’ 
system allowed the jihādist groups to secure the power, transforming violence into 
legitimate domination through the provision of several measures to sustain local 
communities and earn legitimate recognition by them (Polese & Santini 2018).  
Despite the alleged legitimacy of the regional and inter-ethnic grievances 
of the Tuareg nationalist movement, the Northern populations were often more fa-
vourable to the jihādist presence, because of the ability of Islamists to put in place 
socio-economic systems that were compatible with the needs and characteristics of 
the social fabric. Furthermore, while the MNLA was still considered as an ethnic-
based movement fighting for a Tuareg-controlled independent Azawad, the ji-
hādists’ claim to establish an Islamic state in Mali did not rest on any ethnic or racial 
exclusionary attitude (Lecocq et al. 2013).  
Bøås explained the fragile legitimacy of the MNLA stressing that, as a 
movement mainly composed of fighters who returned to Mali in 2011 after years in 
Algeria and Libya, the MNLA was regarded as opportunistic. The militants of Ansār 
al-Dīn, AQIM and MUJWA seemed to be more deeply rooted in the Northern Ma-
lian society, thanks to strong social relations developed over the years, than the 
MNLA. Nationalist demands were largely disconnected from the political and social 
context, in which local communities were not asking for secession, but claimed in-
stead better governance, service delivery, justice and security (Bøås 2015).  
Following the military occupation of the north, the deficit of social and 
political legitimacy of the MNLA insurgents towards the Northern populations 
turned into open hostilities of Malian communities against them. Tuareg nationalists 
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committed violence towards the communities living in the occupied areas, looting 
of banks and public institutions, abuses of power (Onuoha & Thurston 2013) to re-
spond to the need for supplies in the absence of the funding expected to support 
the rebellion (Marchal 2012). They dismantled the state bureaucracy in the occupied 
territories but were unable to build up new administrative structures, and failed to 
enforce order, security and justice (Bøås & Torheim 2013). The MNLA de facto re-
nounced to secure legitimacy to its political power and did not act to strengthen a 
form of popular consent among the communities of the Azawad (Lecocq & Klute 
2013). 
 
The MNLA committed violence against local populations much more 
than other groups. [...] For this reason, the populations of the north 
hated the nationalist rebels, and when the MUJWA expelled the MNLA 
from Gao, the people supported it and agreed with their decision. Sub-
sequently, the situation in Gao was quiet: [...] for this reason, the local 
communities have started to appreciate jihādists, considering that the 
MNLA militiamen were the real terrorists. Somehow, they tolerated the 
shar’īa and the amputations of hands in return for peace (personal 
communication, Tuareg member of the National Assembly of Mali, 09 
December 2016). 
 
In Timbuktu, AQIM members ensured people protection against MNLA 
members’ violence: jihādists provided them with a ‘green’ phone number to call in 
case of harassment by the Tuareg nationalists (Bøås & Torheim 2013). The local 
communities in Gao, hostile to the secessionist intentions of the MNLA fighters, 
rose up against them. They supported to a larger extent the prospects offered by the 
MUJWA mujāhidīn, who “let the MNLA Tuaregs harass the population before in-
tervening and restoring law and order” (Marchal 2013, p. 16). The MUJWA did not 
use a liberation discourse, nor aimed to build an independent state, but rather 
helped to meet the social demands and the economic needs as part of a highly effec-
tive territorial consolidation strategy (Raineri 2015).6 
6 The growing difficulties in providing the delivery of goods and services boosted the re-emergence 
of social cleavages that destabilized the networks of alliance built up by the Salafi-jihādist armed 
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5. France and MNLA: towards a change in the legitimation strategies  
Part of the MNLA's leadership was based in Paris, particularly its media 
and political wing. This aspect contributed to project the movement as a pro-West 
secular force, hoping for support from France and other Western powers (Desgrais 
et al. 2018). Nevertheless, at the first stage of the Tuareg insurrection in Azawad, 
the reaction of French authorities was hesitant. This cautious attitude was imposed 
by the need to protect French expatriates in Mali and by the urgency to manage 
carefully the issue of hostages kidnapped by jihādist groups in the region. Alain 
Juppé, French Minister of Foreign Affairs under Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency, 
talked about the need to “deal with the Tuareg issue in depth” (Notin 2014, p. 70), 
avoiding any sharp condemnation of the insurrection.  
For many observers, the French attitude towards the Malian crisis was the 
natural development of what happened in Libya. Pointing out a historical conver-
gence between French authorities and Kel tamashek people in Sahel, many political 
activists and civil society organizations accused Sarkozy of having reached an 
agreement with the Tuareg fighters enlisted in the Libyan army during the ‘80s. Spe-
cifically, the ‘Libyan’ Tuareg would have deserted, giving up the fight in defence of 
al-Qadhafi’s regime and allowing the French military forces to launch their final of-
fensive. In exchange, they would have received reassurances on the support of 
French diplomacy to the secessionist claims towards the Malian state, on condition 
that they engaged in the struggle against al-Qā’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
in North Mali (Notin 2014).  
On February 26, 2012, Juppé went to Bamako to see Malian President 
Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT), discussing with him the last developments of the 
groups and weakened the systems of governance in the region. This caused in turn the worsening of 
the conditions of social control of the local populations and a more and more severe imposition of 
the Islamic law to the communities by the jihādist authorities, despite the instructions provided by 
the AQIM leadership, which advocated a gradual application of the shar’īa for ensuring success to 
their political project. 
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political and security crisis in the country. During the public press conference, the 
French Minister reaffirmed the importance of ensuring the respect of the funda-
mental principles of unity and territorial integrity, excluding any possibility for a 
military intervention and endorsing the path for an inclusive dialogue with the in-
surgent actors.7 At the same occasion, the local press solicited him to clarify the 
French responsibility regarding the alleged support assured to the MNLA. In fact, 
several Malian political actors highlighted a proximity of French authorities towards 
Tuareg armed groups (Bergamaschi & Diawara 2014), because of historical and cul-
tural linkages and the possibility to obtain from them some sort of assistance for the 
liberation of the hostages detained in the Sahel (personal communication, member 
of the National Assembly of Mali, 24 November 2016). This theory was confirmed, 
in their view, precisely by the presence of some eminent members of the political 
direction of the nationalist movement in France.  
 
We never questioned the unity and territorial integrity of Mali. If asking 
to the MNLA to lay down the arms was enough, this would be perfect. 
Nevertheless, if we restrict ourselves to this view and we continue to 
confront each other, there will be no solution. […] Only a political dia-
logue could allow to come out the impasse and not a violent confronta-
tion, because in this moment the consequences could be extremely se-
vere, not only for Mali but for the whole region. […] Clearly, we need 
to negotiate [with the rebels]. However, what is important to avoid is 
the negotiation with the terrorists. We have denounced since long time 
the danger of AQIM, which got stronger in the last months. […] In our 
view, there is no ambiguity: terrorism is the first enemy and AQIM is 
threatening us directly. […] Therefore, this is the red line not to go be-
yond. For the rest, it is evident that there are issues emerging in North 
Mali, and these issues must be dealt with. It’s not the responsibility of 
France to negotiate or propose solutions: we only could ensure support 
and mediation (personal communication, former French ambassador to 
Mali, 13 May 2016).  
 
7 2012, 'Point de presse de M. Alain Juppé, ministre des affaires étrangères et européennes, sur les 
difficultés de la situation au Mali confronté au terrorisme et menacé dans son intégrité territoriale, 
Bamako le 26 février 2012', Vie Publique, 02 March, viewed 08 January 2019. <http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/123000508.html> 
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The former French ambassador in Bamako denied any hypothesis of a 
presumed preferential treatment for the Tuareg militants: 
 
There was no relationship between the ambassador and the MNLA. In 
2011, some Tuareg representatives in the National Assembly asked for 
meeting me, and I received them. They were members of ADEMA, the 
ruling party supporting ATT. I received them as I received any other 
representative who wished to see me, whichever their party. […] Fol-
lowing the coup d’état, I found out that these representatives had become 
members of the MNLA […]. I never met someone who told me to be a 
MNLA or MNA member, at that time. I knew that they claimed for 
autonomy, but I perceived them just as critical members of the Parlia-
ment (personal communication, former French ambassador to Mali, 13 
May 2016). 
 
The declaration of independence of Azawad triggered the political-
institutional collapse of the country, and encouraged a stronger diplomatic initiative 
by France, together with the regional actors. 
On May 15, François Hollande was officially designated President of the 
Republic. The attention of the new socialist government was directed to the Malian 
crisis, which was considered a foreign policy priority. Initially, the French political 
and diplomatic strategy was based on a clear move away from the MNLA, which 
was deemed as a key player in the crisis but not a partner in the negotiations. The 
legitimacy of the claims raised by the movement was questioned because of the low 
representativeness of the populations of Northern Mali: the Tuareg communities 
were acknowledged as a minority in the North, except for Kidal. In addition, the 
unclear relations with Ag Ghali’s Ansār al-Dīn, which advocated the constitution of 
a Malian Islamic state, carried weight for France, even though the DGSE intelli-
gence services – to which some analysts attribute a proximity to the nationalist 
movement in the region (Marchal 2012) – would continue to maintain a relationship 
with its leaders (Notin 2014). With regard to the declaration of independence of 
Azawad made by the insurgents, France pointed out that a unilateral application of 
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self-determination claims not garnering the recognition of African states could not 
be considered legitimate (Ayoedema 2015). 
However, at the end of November, the French strategy for the manage-
ment of the Malian crisis seemed to change, at least in part. The rupture of the alli-
ance between the MNLA and the Qaedist movements, which excluded the secular 
nationalists from the political-administrative management of the regions of the 
north, allowed the leaders of the movement to redefine their political strategies. The 
violent marginalisation of Tuareg insurgents in Azawad made a political relationship 
with them potentially acceptable for French authorities. A delegation of the move-
ment was received at the Quai d’Orsay, in the presence of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Laurent Fabius, and the Special Representative for the Sahel, Jean-Félix Pa-
ganon. The circumstance seemed to upset the diplomatic balances outlined by Paris 
until then, due to the hostility of Malian political actors towards the Tuareg insur-
gents. The rationale behind the French decision to receive representatives of the 
Azawad movement at the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were not 
specified. It seemed clear, however, the will to engage the nationalist rebels at the 
bargaining table as political interlocutors.  
France explored the willingness of the movement to give up demands for 
independence and secession, within a highly decentralised state and an institutional 
system characterised by the recognition of a wide range of autonomy to the regions 
in the north. However, the negotiations were suspended in the face of the MNLA’s 
requests to prevent the comeback of the Malian army in Kidal: this demand was 
held inadmissible by the French negotiators, since it was not compatible with the 
aim of restoring Malian national unity and territorial integrity.  
The political dialogue initiated by Paris with the representatives of the Tu-
areg insurgents was sharply conflicting with the positions of Malian political actors 
in Bamako, who were adverse to any involvement of the Tuareg movements in the 
crisis management and resolution processes. The meeting between the MNLA dele-
gation, led by Moussa Ag Assarid, and the representatives of French diplomacy 
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raised the anger of Malian political élites in Bamako. They accused France of collu-
sion with the Tuareg insurgents and blamed them for legitimising MNLA ‘terror-
ists’, responsible for the secession of Azawad, through a political dialogue that “was 
enabling them to talk to France24” (personal communication, former French am-
bassador to Mali, 13 May 2016). 
 
6. Variation in rebel orders: a new international legitimacy  
During the night of 9 to 10 January 2013, the jihādist armed groups as-
saulted the town of Konna and its military base. Once again, the Malian army 
proved to be structurally unprepared to deal with the offensive, letting the Qaedist 
armed forces advance (Bergamaschi 2013). The sudden attack southward reinforced 
the consensus on the fact that immediate external military action was needed. On 
January 10, Dioncounda Traoré officially requested military action from France, in 
support of the Malian response to the jihādist attack on the first defence lines of the 
army. Two days later, on January 11, 2013, President Hollande endorsed the de-
ployment of the Opération Serval, consisting of three steps: to block and destroy 
the advance of jihādist pick-ups; to win back the towns of Gao, Kidal and Tim-
buktu; to intercept surviving fighters in the Sahel and in the Adrar Mountains 
(Chivvis 2016; Galy 2013). The main targets of French intervention – preserving the 
Malian sovereignty, restoring the territorial integrity of the state, destroying the ji-
hādist sanctuary in the region – were accomplished within a few weeks (Delage 
2013). The mujāhidīn, deprived of military assets that had been destroyed by the 
bombing of French aviation (Leauthier & Merchet 2013), were forced to evacuate 
the main Northern cities.8 Following the recapture of the north, the French political 
and military apparatus announced that the emergency phase of the operation was 
closed. The next stage of the intervention was the definitive neutralisation of the ji-
8 2013, ‘Where have the jihādists gone?’, The Economist, 02 February, viewed 08 January 2019. 
<https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2013/02/02/where-have-the-jihadists-
gone> 
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hādist threat, in order to ensure the implementation of a state-building process 
(Shurkin 2014). 
The Qaedist armed groups adopted a resistance strategy based on different 
military tactics. They melted into the civil populations, planning an irregular and 
asymmetric warfare consisting of raids, ambushes and suicide bombings (Walther et 
al. 2016). In other cases, they took refuge in the mountains of the Adrar n Ifoghas, 
where the stronghold of AQIM was located, all the while avoiding frontal clashes in 
order to weaken the enemy’s military force in the long term.9  
The political aim of French diplomacy was to develop a form of construc-
tive engagement with the secular Kel tamashek nationalists, involving them in the 
struggle against terrorism and providing “new opportunities to renegotiate their po-
sitions in the power competition with other insurgent actors” (Bencherif & Cam-
pana 2017). The perfect knowledge of the regional geography by the jihādist groups 
seriously challenged the French forces, which were confronted with the enemy on a 
hostile ground, facing the risk of a stagnation of the conflict. The alliance with Tu-
areg rebels was perceived as an effective way to limit the asymmetries of the jihādist 
guerrilla.  
From the beginning of February, the French authorities had already put 
forward a statement of legitimacy for the Tuareg ‘non-terrorists’ rebels from MNLA 
and MIA, a breakaway group of Ansār al-Dīn led by Alghabbas Ag Intallah, the son 
of the traditional Ifoghas authority (Wing 2016). They were raised to the rank of 
unavoidable bargaining actors in the negotiations for the restoration of constitu-
tional legality in the country (Bencherif & Campana 2017). On the same days, 
French soldiers were entering Kidal without the support of Malian soldiers, in order 
to limit the potential risk of interethnic violence (Wing 2013). This was seen as a 
9 The definition of fluid conflict, i.e. a war made by “actors susceptible to rapidly change and adapt to 
the strategic environment” seems particularly suited to describe the characteristics of the third phase 
of confrontation between French forces and the jihādist armed groups: “Organisational transforma-
tions broaden the range of fluid actors options. Deprived of the limits represented by a population 
to defend or preserve, they earn a certain freedom which enables them to target all types of objec-
tive, even the least conventional” (Leboeuf 2005, pp. 625-638). 
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confirmation of the existence of an agreement, negotiated and concluded by the 
DGSE services, between Paris and representatives of the Azawad’s liberation 
movement. France would have taken advantage of the deep knowledge of the Adrar 
upland areas by Tuareg rebels and the valuable information provided by the follow-
ers of Ag Intallah on Ansār al-Dīn, in order to identify the jihādist fighters, weaken 
their resistance and obtain the release of the Western hostages held by them (Notin 
2014). In return, the control of the town of Kidal would have been temporarily as-
signed to the Tuareg groups (Lecocq & Klute 2019), while members of the Malian 
national army would have been prevented to access the area. In the medium term, 
the issue of recognising the territorial autonomy to the Tuareg communities would 
have been taken into account. 
According to Mampilly, the variation in rebel governance systems “stems 
from a combination of the initial preferences of rebel leaders and the interaction of 
insurgent organizations with a variety of other social and political actors” (Mampilly 
2011, pp. 15-16). This reflects the shifting sources of legitimacy for nationalist rebel 
actors in North Mali. The Tuareg secular movement became politically attractive to 
France (Desgrais et al. 2018). It was co-opted as part of a strategy intended for iden-
tifying and killing the mujāhidīn in the massif of Ifoghas, despite the hostilities of 
the national political representatives and the population in Bamako against the 
Azawadian movements.10 Marginalised by the jihādist groups and forced to seek 
refuge in the Kidal stronghold, the Tuareg insurgents laid down the conditions for a 
collaboration with French forces in the north, which was needed by Paris to con-
duct the military operations, detect and eradicate the Qaedist mujāhidīn in the Adrar 
n Ifoghas. France recognised the MNLA and MIA militias’ right to exercise admin-
istrative and security control over the territory of Kidal, ensuring that the Malian na-
tional army would have been banned from the area until the conditions for democ-
10 Among people in Bamako favourable to negotiations for the resolution of the crisis in the North, 
only a small minority (18%) was supportive of a dialogue with jihādist or Tuareg nationalist move-
ment (MNLA) according to a Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES Bamako) survey conducted in February 
2013. 
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racy were restored. Thus, the political recognition they obtained by cooperating 
with France in the framework of the military operations in the north was part of a 
strategy of action intended to acquire an international legitimacy functional to the 
pursuit of its aims. This strengthen all the while jihādist insurgents’ legitimacy based 
on the opposition to external actors’ interference in local-rooted dynamics and their 
nature of ‘crusader’ invaders. 
The alliance between France and MNLA was eventually confirmed. The 
Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian highlighted the good intelligence relations as 
well as the logistical and operational coordination with the Tuareg groups, which 
had accompanied the French advance in the north and guaranteed some popular 
support for the presence of Western troops on the territory of Kidal (Shurkin 
2014).  
The acknowledgement of a political and military relationship with the Tu-
areg groups gave rise to strong criticisms in Bamako, where a large majority of peo-
ple claimed that the MNLA was standing up for its own members’ interests.11 
French authorities were accused of supporting the cause of the Tuareg terrorists, as 
the rebels were still defined, although they had distanced themselves from the ji-
hādists of Ansār al-Dīn, AQIM and MUJWA, and declared they would have been 
ready to negotiate with the government. In the perception of people and political 
élites in Bamako, Paris was giving legitimacy to the members of insurgent groups 
who had been involved in conflict violence and found guilty of having triggered the 
crisis, undermining the integrity of the state and the sovereignty of national institu-
tions. In particular, President Dioncounda Traoré criticised the French decision to 
involve the MIA rebels in the crisis management processes, stating that he did not 
recognise any difference between Ansār al-Dīn and dissidents led by Ag Intallah, 
11 89% of people interviewed in Bamako accused the MNLA of defending particular interests rather 
than prioritising Tuareg communities’ demands. 90% of the cross-section deemed that the MNLA 
and MIA preventing Malian army’s entry to Kidal was incomprehensible (25,8%) or inacceptable 
(64,1%). 
2013, Mali – Mètre. Enquête d’opinion « Que pensent les Maliens ? », no. 2, Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/mali/10100/2013-02.pdf> 
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who escaped their responsibilities and dissociated from Ag Ghali and AQIM for 
opportunistic reasons (Boisbouvier 2013). Ambassador Rouyer warned the French 
authorities against the political risks of a strategy intended to promote the MIA and 
the MNLA insurgents as privileged partners: 
 
Four days after the start of the intervention, [...] there were French flags 
everywhere. In Bamako, people called children 'François Hollande'. It 
was something huge, a total reversal of the initial situation. However, I 
warned to pay attention, as these ‘acquis’ remained fragile and if ever 
we French gave the sense of double standards, treating Gao and Tim-
buktu differently from Kidal, we would have had problems. We could 
not give the idea of protecting the MNLA and the MIA when the aim 
was to fight AQIM. We needed to be clear and impose the Malian au-
thorities on the national territory as a whole. On this point, the analyses 
diverged from the ones in Paris. The Government was at the forefront 
of the need to find an agreement on the ground. I understood the mili-
tary aspect and the will of not having to deal with armed forces on the 
two fronts, the jihādist and the secessionist forces, but regarding the 
strategy of relying on the secessionist forces to fight jihādists... person-
ally, I did not agree (personal communication, former French ambassa-
dor to Mali, 13 May 2016). 
 
7. The MNLA and the power struggle over Kidal 
The territorial integrity of Mali was formally restored with the re-
establishment of the French and Malian control on the regions occupied by the 
Salafi armed groups. However, Kidal represented an outstanding exception. French 
forces delegated the security and political-administrative control of the area to the 
Tuareg armed movements until the conclusion of a peace deal with Bamako. Within 
the framework of this agreement, the FAMa (Forces Armées Maliennes) were pre-
vented to entry the city in order to avoid violent clashes with rebel armed groups 
and possible reprisals against civilian populations.12  
12 In May 2013, more than a half of Bamako (69,4%) and Mopti (56,8%) dwellers stated that they 
didn’t trust the collaboration between the insurgent groups and French forces, since they accessed 
Kidal together with MNLA and MIA’s rebels preventing Malian army to restore their control over 
the town.  
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De facto, France recognised a special status to one of the main urban cen-
tres in the north and imposed limitations on the exercise of sovereignty by the na-
tional institutions in Mali. As explained by a diplomatic official at the French Em-
bassy in Bamako, “in the occasion of the recapture of the north, the Malian army 
had [demonstrated] neither the human capacities nor the military capabilities needed 
to provide an effective contribution to the peace-building” (personal communica-
tion, civil servant at the French embassy of Mali, 02 December 2016). In other 
words, Paris gave legitimacy to a system of governance defined by the monopoly on 
the use of force by (former) insurgent actors, and characterised by the exclusion of 
political state actors, government authorities and military institutions.  
The recognition of an exception regarding the territory of Kidal fed the 
upsurge in the conflict between local security forces and the national army. On May 
17, 2014, Prime Minister Moussa Mara decided to move to Kidal in order to estab-
lish the state authority in a territory that had been outside the scope and control of 
the Malian institutions until that moment. This decision occurred despite the unfa-
vourable opinion expressed by the French forces, the UN mission for the stabiliza-
tion of the country (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabiliza-
tion Mission in Mali, MINUSMA) and other members of the government, based on 
the assessment of a serious risk of fighting and violent demonstrations. Mara’s ini-
tiative boosted the armed response of rebel militias, which led to the death of sol-
diers and institutional members of the government delegation.13 On May 20, Mara 
ordered the armed forces to move northwards and free the city of Kidal. Many sol-
diers were killed or forced to flee and leave to Bamako. Several requests for Prime 
Minister’s resignation were made, but he also obtained a form of popular recogni-
2013, Mali – Mètre. Enquête d’opinion « Que pensent les Maliens ? », no. 3, Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/mali/10100/2013-03.pdf> 
13 2014, ‘Moussa Mara à Kidal: retour sur une visite mouvementée’, RFI, 21 May, viewed 12 January 
2019. <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140521-mali-moussa-mara-kidal-retour-une-visite-
mouvementee>  
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tion for defending the unity of the Malian nation (Wing 2014). Looking back at the 
events in Kidal, Mara complained about his decisions as legitimate: 
 
When I was appointed as Prime Minister, a governorate of Kidal was 
established. The Malian army was present and the Malian state worked 
enough. [...] Services and other functions started to be restored. The 
armed groups had signed the Ouagadougou Agreement, which made it 
possible to organise the elections. Group leaders took part in the proc-
ess, and many of them are members of the National Assembly of Mali. 
As Prime Minister of Mali, I claimed the possibility to leave to Kidal. 
My visit had absolutely nothing to do with a provocation: it was just an 
administrative visit to make sure that the public services were at the 
disposal of the communities of Kidal, since we considered them as Ma-
lians as the people in Bamako. […] There should not have been any 
limit to the freedom of movement of the Prime Minister on the ground: 
for this reason, I have no regret for what I did. I would do it again ex-
actly in the same way. The events following the visit took place rather 
because of a deliberate attack by the armed groups on an official delega-
tion of the state, and I think that this is the way it should be considered 
and dealt with. They attacked unarmed civilian administrators and killed 
them, committing a war crime. Ascribing to me the responsibility for 
death and destruction means giving evidence of amnesia or bad faith. 
[…] Political and public engagement must be undertaken based on 
principles and beliefs. The first of these principles is that we are a sov-
ereign state that is internationally recognised and has some territories 
that need to be integrated. The legitimate authorities should have the 
right to go to these territories (personal communication, former Prime 
Minister of Mali, 20 November 2016). 
 
The Kidal crisis certified the state’s inability to impose its own authority on 
part of the national territory, showing the limitations on the exercise of its sover-
eignty, which had been formally re-established after the international intervention 
(Baudais 2015). The armed groups prevented the establishment of local authorities 
and prefects and the access to the territory by the armed forces. Teachers and all 
professional figures who were linked to the state authority were fired. In 2016, one 
of the main political opponents to the President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, Soumaïla 
Cissé, described the situation of Kidal: 
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After the Prime Minister’s visit, we completely lost Kidal: the armed 
groups came back and the administration defected all the north of  the 
country. Schools are closed, judges have gone, administration moved to 
big regional capitals and big cities. Today, in Kidal, there is no 
representation of  the national administration. The governor itself  is no 
longer there. [...] The elections scheduled were not held, and this is not 
happening because people do not want, but rather because the armed 
groups and the criminal networks prevent it. They cheated the ballot, 
threatened people and confiscated electoral material. [...] There can be 
no sovereignty as long as the administration is not present on the 
territory (personal communication, member of  the National Assembly 
of  Mali, 23 November 2016). 
 
France and the members of MINUSMA, which were angered by the initia-
tive of the Prime Minister Mara and refused to secure his convoy on the way to the 
governorate, were accused of protecting the Tuareg in Kidal. French policy was 
confronted with its contradictions: on the one hand, Paris claimed support of the 
Tuareg forces in the struggle against the jihādist armed groups and for the restora-
tion of Malian sovereignty in the north while, on the other hand, it prevented the 
state to affirm authority over part of its territory. In this view, the connections be-
tween special forces, political circles in Paris and Tuareg groups did produce a cer-
tain tolerance towards the MNLA members, which were legitimated by the interna-
tional recognition and were enabled to further strengthen their influence and politi-
cal weight in Kidal. After the signing of the Algiers Peace Agreement in 2015, the 
ambiguities of a convergence between French political and military authorities and 
the coalition of former Tuareg rebels, the CMA (Coordination des Mouvements de 
l’Azawad), fostered the consolidation of a mutual-benefitting relationship. As Mar-
chal pointed out: 
 
In Mali, there have been extremely ambivalent feelings towards French 
intervention. On the one hand, France was celebrated, during the trips 
of Hollande to Timbuktu [...] while on the other side it was considered 
the source of any attempt to divide Mali or to install the Tuareg groups 
in power. What is true, since there are clearly signals to this effect, is 
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[the existence of] a huge ambiguity from the Bakhane force, which 
needs [the collaboration] of Tuareg people to track the storages of 
weapons of the militant networks, and thus establishes alliance with 
Tuareg groups, as well as the traditional or administrative authorities. 
[...] This is the main reason why Barkhane is silent about the trafficking 
of drugs, while at the time of the intervention, in the spring of 2013, 
Serval took action against what it defined ‘narco-jihādists’ (personal 
communication, French senior analyst, 13 June 2016). 
 
Therefore, the reciprocal interests of the Barkhane force – which replaced 
Serval in 2014, in the context of a reorganization of French military presence in the 
Sahelian region (Hanne 2016) – and former insurgents produced severe conse-
quences on the definition of post-conflict security balances, guaranteeing them im-
munity and the ability to carry on their own illicit business (Baldaro 2018).14 
 
8. Conclusion 
The concept of ‘legitimacy’ refers to the relationship between political ac-
tors and people, specifically concerning the right of the state to impose rules on its 
subjects who agree to comply with them. It steers the discourse over the nature of 
the MNLA as a political-military organisation representative of the majority of the 
north-Malian populations, and the political appeal of their secessionist claims. Con-
versely to the alleged trans-ethnic and regional nature of its political demands, 
which the presumed social legitimacy was based on, the low level of representative-
ness of the MNLA – which is essentially perceived as the product of alliance and 
internal conflict dynamics within the Tuareg ethnic community – undermined its 
capacity to obtain popular support for the nationalist project in Azawad. The weak 
social and performative legitimacy of the MNLA explains its marginal role in the 
political dynamics of military occupation and administrative control of the Gao, Ki-
dal and Timbuktu territories. Salafi-jihādist movements were deemed capable of 
14 The distinctions between nationalist rebel militants and narco-traffickers in Northern Mali has of-
ten been highly nuanced, depending on the political and economic interests at stake. The involve-
ment of former insurgents or local ‘big men’ – or even state officials – in the trafficking networks is 
still a recurring feature in the region.  
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meeting the social needs of the populations by addressing the bad institutional gov-
ernance and deficit of service delivery through the adoption of economic support 
measures and the provision of essential goods and services. On the contrary, the 
MNLA members were perceived as invaders and accused of abuse and widespread 
violence; the movement was largely considered the main driver and cause of the cri-
sis in the North, together with poor state governance and widespread corruption, 
according to surveys (Bleck et al. 2016). Thus, to the extent that the legitimacy 
“turns out to be created, maintained and destroyed not at the input but at the out-
put side of the political system” (Rothstein 2009, p. 313), the MNLA’s inability to 
emerge as a credible political actor, failing to address the needs of local communi-
ties, illustrated its low legitimacy. 
In the wake of the failure of MNLA’s nationalist plans in Azawad, the 
trade-off between ‘domestic’ legitimacy in North Mali and international legitimacy 
provided the Tuareg-based movement with an opportunity to switch its political 
goals, aiming at tightening control over Kidal. Thus, the deepening of the political 
relations between the French diplomatic authorities and the leaders of the Tuareg 
insurgents has allowed the movement to gain a stronger position in the power 
struggle with the state. Furthermore, it fostered the consolidation of an informal 
governance system in Kidal, defined by the exclusion of the state actors and the 
monopoly over the legitimate use of force by non-state actors. In this regard, while 
the French intervention and the deployment of military operations Serval and Bark-
hane restricted the exercise of Malian sovereignty, by awarding a particular status to 
the Kidal territory, the Tuareg armed groups steered the political strategies of 
France in a direction consistent with their own political interests. Therefore, the re-
definition of the legitimation strategies through a partial adjustment of their claims 
and political objectives, allowed the MNLA to acquire a new centrality in the re-
gional balances and to secure an informal system of governance.  
The international legitimacy acquired by MNLA as a result of the French 
decision to grant the secular rebel movement a privileged position in the negotiation 
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processes for the resolution of the crisis, finally met the resistance of political and 
civil society in Bamako. In this sense, the constructed nature of an ‘Islamist threat’, 
which motivated and shaped the intervention (Bergamaschi 2013), and the political 
use of the concept of ‘terrorism’, employed by France to justify its military involve-
ment in Mali and to obtain political legitimacy from the international community 
(Charbonneau & Jourde 2016), was part of a strategy intended to exclude Ansār al-
Dīn from any bargaining table. At the same time, the use of the concept of terror-
ism emerged in the mainstream discourse of the political actors in Bamako. First, 
the interim authorities in Bamako capitalised on the perception of a terrorist threat 
in order to garner international support. In addition, they took advantage of it to 
discredit the nationalist insurgents, who were accused of having triggered the insti-
tutional collapse of the state (Charbonneau & Sears 2014). The different claims of 
the Tuareg groups – the independence of the Azawad by the MNLA, and the appli-
cation of the shar’īa all over the country by Ansār al-Dīn – influenced a completely 
divergent perception of the notion of terrorism and a different political use by the 
actors involved in the crisis dynamics. 
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